Berkeley's conception of nature by Aldrich, Virgil C.
PUBLIC LECTURES 
I 
BERKELEY’S C O N C E P T I O N  OF N A T U R E  
U R I N G  the reign of the English Queen Anne, a twenty- D one-year-old Irishman in Trinity College, Dublin, 
wrote:  “I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great 
man.” I t  was not impudence in George Berkeley, born two 
hundred and fifty years ago, that  moved him to say this. H e  
lived in an age which, on the one hand, was witnessing the 
failure of the ideal of a united Christendom, and which in 
consequence inclined many cultured minds towards fatalism 
and atheism. On the other hand, the domain of abstract 
thought was then dominated by the works of the great 
philosophers Descartes and Locke. And in their dualisms 
of mind and matter lay the germ of scepticism. If there is 
a vast realm of material reality totally excluded from the 
realm of mind, how can mind know matter?  In short, cer- 
tain great men, because of their far-sightedness, had been 
content to view reality from a distance, and had thereby 
missed the fine detail in the picture. A closer view would 
have provided a corrective for  false and borrowed precon- 
ceptions. Berkeley, modestly admitting his intellectual 
myopia,l claimed to  have discovered something which greater 
genius had overlooked. H e  had to hold the object close to  
see anything, and he found the wherewithal to remedy the 
growing scepticism in religion and philosophy. Therefore, 
1 Principles o f  Human Knowledge, Works, Vol. I, p. 239 (Fraser’s edition), 
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he was not willing to pin his faith on the sleeves of great 
men. H e  believed that, by their very greatness, they had 
raised a dust and thus set themselves and other people to 
complaining that they could not see. So, as a young mind 
“not yet debauched with learning,’’ he assigned himself the 
task of clearing the atmosphere. 
Everyone has heard the term “Berkeleyan Scepticism,” 
and many believe that it properly names his philosophy. But 
those who catch the point and spirit of his thinking know that 
i t  is an absurd misnomer. Berkeley’s main concern was not 
t o  establish scepticism, but to demolish it. And if in any 
sense he can be called a sceptic, it is the sense in which the 
person who doubts the existence of human quadrupeds is 
called sceptical. Obviously, if you take a man to be a ra- 
tional quadruped, you must doubt the existence of man. 
This, as we shall see, is precisely the sense in which Berkeley 
is sceptical of the existence of a material world. Matter as 
misconceived is indeed dubitable. But such scepticism, being 
engendered by misconception only, is neither necessary nor 
natural. And Berkeley believed that the scepticism of his 
day was of this nature-something to which a natural end 
might be put simply by getting ideas of things as they are. 
Now I am going first t o  describe nature as it was generally 
conceived in the English-speaking world a t  the beginning of 
the eighteenth century ; indicating also the sceptical implica- 
tions of this view. Then, beside it, I shall build up Berkeley’s 
conception of nature. In the light of the contrast, I hope to 
impress you with the force of some of Berkeley’s arguments. 
The  majority of reflective persons, under the spell of 
Newton and Locke, looked upn nature as a system of inert 
bodies existing in absolute space and time. These bodies 
are made up of small bits of dead matter called atoms and 
their properties are solidity, mass, motion, size, shape, abso- 
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lute place, absolute date, and number. In  the course of their 
motion, they suffer impacts, and then some of them have 
sensations. Those having sensations are called “organ- 
isms.” Sensations occur “in” these organisms or  in the 
minds which permeate them. There are hot and cold sen- 
sations, sweet and sour ones, red and blue. These and the 
like exist only in the mind of the organism and represent 
nothing outside it. They are called “ideas” or “images.” 
But there are also moving images, big and square ones, sen- 
sations of solidity, and the like. These in respect of their 
size, shape, motion, etc., though also existing in the mind, 
represent real physical properties of matter in the external 
world of nature, whose existence is in no way dependent on 
minds. By means of such ideas or  images, we “know” the 
physical nature of things. 
Now we shall imagine Berkeley asking Locke some ques- 
tions concerning this view. 
Berkeley: Why locate such qualities as color and sounds 
and smells in the mind and allow them to represent nothing? 
L o c k e :  Because they are relative to and dependent on 
the observing mind. T w o  persons looking a t  the same ob- 
ject would not get exactly the same color-sensation. There- 
fore color is not in the object but in the mind only. 
Berkeley: But would two persons perceive exactly the 
same shape? 
Locke:  No, not immediately. 
Berkeley: Then why not give shape the same status as 
color or sound or  smell, making all perceived properties de- 
pendent on mind? 
Locke:  Because the real physical shape may be deter- 
mined by reasoning. 
Berkeley: Why cannot the real physical smell of a body 
be likewise determined? 
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Locke:  I prefer you to  ask me another question. 
Berkeley: Good. 
any color whatsoever ? 
Locke:  No. 
Berkeley: Then when you speak of colorless surfaces of 
solid bodies, you have no idea of what you are talking about? 
Locke:  I have an abstract idea of it. Simply abstract 
the color from the surface by an intellectual act of analysis 
and what is left is the real physical surface. 
Berkeley: But I find that when I mentally abstract the 
color, I take with it also the shape of the surface, since it is 
the outline of the patch of color which constitutes the shape. 
And surface without a shape is indeed a queer entity. One 
might as well argue that he has an abstract idea of square 
circles and that, though unimaginable, they exist in nature. 
L o c k e :  But we have sensory evidence of the existence of 
surfaces. 
Berkeley: N o t  of colorless surfaces. Only of extended 
patches of color, o r  of warm or cold tangible surface. Now, 
I presume you have an idea of mat ter?  
When you mentally abstract 
all the qualities of matter, the x which is left as a bearer of 
these properties is matter. I confess I don’t know what this 
material x is in essence. 
Berkeley: Then what you directly perceive is not matter, 
but certain qualities only? 
Locke:  Yes. 
Berkeley : If there is no sensory evidence for the existence 
of this unknown material substance, why in the name of 
heaven believe that it exists? 
Locke:  W e  must posit something as the external cause of 
the sensations in our minds. 
Berkeley: T o  be sure, but why posit matter as you have 
Can you imagine a surface without 
Locke:  An abstract idea. 
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defined it? If matter is genuinely to cause anything, it must 
be active, and according to  you it is completely passive and 
inert, even when in motion. Furthermore, will you explain 
how matter in motion causes a sensation in a living organism? 
Locke:  A sensation is somehow or other annexed to the 
motions of particles in the brain, but I cannot describe the 
details of the process. 
Berkeley: It appears, Locke, that  in positing the existence 
of material substance as you have conceived it, you have 
presented yourself with a white elephant. I t  is an inactive 
cause, it “causes)) sensations in an unknowable manner, and 
is itself in essence unknowable. You are logic-bound to be 
a sceptic as regards the existence of material substance. 
And when I squeeze your “abstract ideas” of it for the juice 
of their meaning, not one little drop do we get out of them. 
Why  not leave this theoretically useless substratum out of 
our picture of nature, and paint another one? Besides fos- 
tering scepticism in philosophy, your material substance 
breeds atheism in the field of religion. It is a brute, blind 
somewhat, unknowable and oppressive, filling man with a 
sense of being huddled about by thoughtless and careless 
natural forces. Perhaps we can portray nature more truly, 
not by excluding matter from the picture, but only what 
scientists and philosophers call material substance. . . . 
Berkeley, a t  the age of twenty-five, and twenty-four years 
before he became Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland, did paint 
another picture, and a very beautiful one. Whether it rep- 
resents reality-i.e., whether it is true-I shall let you judge. 
I propose now to  exhibit Berkeley’s conception of nature, de- 
veloping i t  not exactly as he did, but in a manner calculated 
to draw sympathetic attention to what he took to be the 
most important points. Berkeley’s world-view appears 
bizarre to  him who simply stares a t  it unreflectively. Berke- 
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ley’s readers and critics for a hundred years entirely missed 
the point of his philosophy, and, according to the general 
estimate, the speculative side of him was freakish-except 
in the medical part  of his treatise on tar-water. The  famous 
theologian, Samuel Clarke, would not even argue with him. 
When, thanks to his friend Swift, his philosophy of nature 
was introduced to English circles, a certain physician is re- 
ported to have become anxious about Berkeley’s mental 
health. There is a story about Swift himself, according to 
which Swift, when Berkeley came to see him on a rainy 
evening, let him stand outside the closed door, since, if 
Berkeley were right about the nature of physical objects 
such as doors, he should be able to pass through them closed 
as readily as open. All of which shows how much Berkeley 
was misunderstood, and how important it is to strip our- 
selves of stiff preconceptions to be able to follow the lead of 
his supple and vigorous thinking. 
Since Berkeley’s doctrine is, in brief, that only minds and 
their ideas exist, that physical nature is nothing but a patch- 
work of ideas or  sensations “in minds,” we shall begin by a 
careful inquiry into the meaning of the phrase “in the mind,” 
to show how conceivable, even reasonable, Berkeley’s view 
is.’ 
Imagine your organism standing on an open plain and 
gazing across it a t  a blue range of mountains. You observe 
between your imagined body and the imagined mountains a 
distance of some sixty miles, and there are clouds which 
seem still farther away. Now if you were asked, where 
is this imagined scene, with its forms and colors, would you 
not say that it is in your mind, and that those clouds and 
‘Berkeley’s failure to analyze and define the properties of the relation 
“in” where it is one of mental inclusion is a main weakness of his philosophy. 
See his comment in the Principles,  Works,  Vo!. I, p. 284. 
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hills and plain and gazing organism have no reality outside 
your mind? I think you would, and I suspect the answer is 
in some sense true. Now open your eyes and perceive your 
own bodies, and the desk and the chairs before you, and the 
blackboard. Again there is a case of an organism gazing a t  
something a t  a distance from it. But if you were asked 
where this second system of experienced objects exists, I take 
i t  you would deny that they are in your mind or in anybody 
else’s. I t  is preposterous to  suppose that these real physical 
things exist in minds. Their  status, you argue, is abso- 
lutely non-mental. But what makes you think so? Is it 
because you perceive them a t  a distance from and outside 
your organism? If so, then why not say the imagined moun- 
tains are outside your mind, since they too were observed to  
be a t  a distance from your imagined organism. If it is 
highly conceivable that the whole imaginal situation is in 
the mind, why not the perceptual, also ? T h e  only differ- 
ence between the imaginal and perceptual situations seems to 
be that the perceptual is a little more stable, a little more 
fixed. And that by itself is no reason to think it is inde- 
pendent of and outside the mind. Situations existing only in 
the mind may, for  all we know off-hand, be as stable as you 
please. 
This  is the significance of the phrase “in the mind,” as 
Berkeley uses it, and let us grasp it to  begin with, even before 
we examine Berkeley’s arguments to show that the material 
world is “in,” and dependent on, mind. Otherwise, we too, 
are likely to  look upon his whole enterprise as initially and 
finally freakish. W e  simply must not forget that, just as it 
is good sound sense to say that  a vast panorama of imagined 
things exists in the mind, so the assertion that  perceived 
things exist only in minds may also be fa r  from absurd, and 
may even be true. But,  someone may object, the proposition 
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that perceived objects are in the mind has queer implications. 
F o r  example, when a man beholds the moon more than two 
hundred thousand miles away, does not his mind become 
more than two hundred thousand miles long, if this distance- 
interval is in his mind? By no means. Imagine yourself 
looking a t  the moon. Again you have the same distance 
between you and your object. And you admit that this whole 
imagined situation is in your mind. Does that imply that 
your mind must be as long as the imagined distance? No. 
Then, for all we as yet know, perceived distance may also be 
in the mind without odd consequences for mind, just as a 
sound-sensation is admittedly “in” the mind without making 
the mind itself noisy. W e  have first-hand evidence in the 
case of imagination that an apparently spatialized system 
of things may be in the mind without thereby causing the 
mind itself to acquire their spatial characteristics. T h e  
same may be true in the case of sense-perception. Indeed, 
there is a fund of evidence which purports to show that 
physical nature, as experienced in sense-perception, really 
does exist, without residue, only in mind. 
Since we are already familiar with the arguments in favor 
of the doctrine that what is perceived depends upon per- 
spective and that therefore perceived nature does not exist 
absolutely but only relative to  this or  that perceiving mind, 
I am not going to belabor the point here. Berkeley leans 
heavily on this argument from characteristics being what 
they are only relative to minds. Perceived mass, motion, 
change, shape, size, color, sound, etc., all depend on the 
point of view and the “frame of mind” to which they are 
given as objects of experience. Their “reference-frame” is 
always some mind. T o  try to conceive any one of them as 
being the real and absolute quality of a thing is to engage 
in the fruitless exercise of formulating an “abstract idea.” 
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Rather than retrace these arguments step by step,l I shall 
sketch certain conclusions to  which they directed Berkeley, 
particularly with reference to matter, space, and time. This  
will lead on to his theory of Divine Visual Language and 
of the relation of the physical world to  God and ourselves. 
W e  turn first to matter or  to the meaning of the term 
“material thing.” Perhaps you have already felt the urge 
to remark, in connection with Berkeley’s wholesale relega- 
tion of perceived qualities to the realm of mind, that  be- 
yond this variable screen of sensory appearances lies a 
constant something which itself is not mind-dependent and 
to  which the variable qualities are said to  belong. Behind 
the fabric of shifting sensations or mind-dependent images 
-Berkeley calls them “ideas”-lies a constant extra-mental 
reality. And this, you say, is the realm of matter and of 
material things. Now Berkeley is willing to  admit a reality 
behind sensory appearance, as we shall see, but he has good 
reasons for refusing to call it material, o r  a system of physi- 
cal nuclei to  which the perceived qualities are ascribed. Only 
one devastating difficulty which arises from such a concep- 
tion need be mentioned. If these so-called material things 
exist outside minds, but all their perceived properties exist 
only in minds as has been proved, have you not an extremely 
queer divorce between qualities and the physical things they 
are said to qualify? And what could such physical things 
possibly be as divested of all known properties? There 
is no answer, and scepticism with regard to the nature and 
existence of physical things us outside mind seems to be the 
result. It is you, if you entertain this conception of matter, 
who must turn skeptic. But Berkeley is not willing to  be 
sceptical about the existence and nature of material things. 
H e  is not going to  think of men as quadrupeds and then be 
See Three  Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Works ,  Vol. I. 
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forced to  doubt that there are men. Rather, he is going 
to  investigate the status of physical objects more closely and 
get a notion truer than the old “abstract idea” of them, 
in the light of which new conception scepticism will lose its 
raison d’gtre. 
A material thing, for Berkeley, is simply a “congeries” 
o r  collection of sensations and images, where “sensation” 
means something immediately sensed. Thus, physical ob- 
jects are directly perceived by the senses. Instead of lying 
mysteriously behind sensory appearance, through which veil 
one must reach by the groping arms of inference, they are 
immediately exposed in sense-perception. Fo r  example, an 
apple is nothing but the round and the red and the cool and 
the sweet you become aware of when you see, touch, and 
taste it. Eventually, experience teaches you to  associate, 
in imagination, certain other qualities with those directly 
sensed, such that when you merely look a t  a certain conjunc- 
tion of the visual qualities “round” and “red”, your imagi- 
nation supplies the unseen qualities “sweet”, “solid”, etc., 
and you say that you “see” an apple; though all you literally 
see with your eyes is a patch of color in a certain light. This  
whole complex of perceived and suggested qualities is identi- 
cal with the apple, and the material thing in this case is just 
this aggregate of qualities. But do not a t  least some of 
these qualities “belong to” some x, which latter is the physi- 
cal object? Berkeley’s answer is negative. Qualities refer 
to  and connect up with one another to form a kind of system, 
but the whole system does not itself refer o r  belong to a 
material nucleus called the apple. T h e  system of qualities 
is sufficient in itself to constitute the material thing. 
Now, if such is the nature of physical objects, who can be 
doubtful about their nature or existence? T h a t  they exist, 
and what they are, becomes immediately evident in ordinary 
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sensory experience. Simply to  be awake is to be convinced 
of both. If this is what (‘material thing” means, then in- 
deed it may be granted that we know a good deal about 
matter and material things. But the new conception stimu- 
lates questions, which we shall ask Berkeley. It appears 
that physical nature is in one absolute space, and a public 
object of knowledge. But according to  the view that ma- 
terial things are only sensations or  ideas, nature is resolved 
into as many private worlds in private spaces as there are 
minds. I s  not this absurd, that  every mind contains its own 
little physical nature within itself, including the space in 
which that nature appears? Berkeley answers that there is 
indeed no absolute space. Stripped of all particular sizes, 
shapes, moving bodies, etc., space is nothing but a meaning 
less abstract idea. All immediately perceived spatial proper- 
ties such as size and shape, together with distance and mo- 
tion, are demonstrably relative to mind, and their relativity 
infects the whole of space. Berkeley is speaking psycho- 
logically here, and his opinion is confirmed by recent work in 
Gestalt psychology. And spatial magnitudes in perception 
depend on such qualitative factors as light and shade, etc., 
none of which is absolute. Your space is not my space, and 
neither you nor I have ever perceived a space including both. 
There may be something including us and others like us, 
but there is no evidence proving that this something is space. 
You must not assume that space is the only entity which can 
include things. Mind too is capable of including, though in 
a sense more difficult to  define. Fo r  example, if you have 
an alert mind, it is ‘(full” of suggestions. It contains or 
includes suggestions, though not as a drawer contains pieces 
of chalk. Is it not possible that the all-inclusive something 
which you mistake for space is a mind-the infinite mind of 
God in which we live, move, and have our being, much as, 
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for example, suggestions exist “in,’ our finite minds? W e  
shall see later how Berkeley develops this notion. I mention 
i t  here for the light it throws on his conception of space. 
Minds are not in space, but spaces are in minds. Minds are 
not in skulls, but skulls are in minds. Hence, minds are not 
separated from one another by spatial intervals as skulls 
are, but by a kind of non-spatial 0therness.l You cannot 
measure the interval between your mind and my mind by 
a yardstick. T h e  interval between them is somewhat like 
the interval between two movements of a symphony, and 
that certainly is not spatial distance. Space with the clear- 
cut intervals it has as object of vision, turns out to be a 
“waking dream”, to use a phrase Berkeley borrowed from 
Plato; and “high” and “low” even in the field of vision are 
ultimately as metaphorical as when applied to  musical notes. 
Berkeley does frequently use the term “real distance”, but 
such ‘(distance” is never the object of sight and, upon analy- 
sis, resolves itself into the sort of non-spatial intervals which 
subsist between sensations in a temporal series. Fo r  ex- 
ample, the real distance of a fire seen as a t  about a mile 
from your organism is not this visualized interval, but rather 
is it the interval between a certain yellow color sensation- 
seeing” the fire-and the sensation of warmth you have 
when, as you say, you “approach” the fire. And this interval 
between a color- and a temperature-sensation is obviously 
not visualized distance. 
W e  have just used the adjective “temporal”, and that 
raises the question of time. Is there an absolute, mathe- 
matical time, as Newton believed? Again Berkeley’s answer 
is negative. Time is nothing but sequences of sensations in 
minds, hence there are as many times as there are minds. 
When a certain sequence of ideas or  sensations is imme- 
& (  
1 Berkeley calls it “alterity”. Siris, Works, Vol. 111, p. 282. 
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diately fe l t  as rapid, then real time literally “flies,” since 
sequences of ideas constitute time. T h e  notion of absolute 
time, moving with majestic regularity in all quarters of the 
universe, is the result of meaningless abstraction. T h e  life 
of a fly is as long as the life of a man, if only the sensations 
in each creature are felt as constituting a considerable tem- 
poral span. Felt or  sensed sequence is the only real time. 
Le t  us ask Berkeley another question. Physical or  per- 
ceived nature, as distinct from merely imagined nature, is 
regular, orderly, “cosmic” in the Greek sense of the word. 
T o  account for this fact, we are obliged to ascribe causal 
properties to material things, whereby one thing necessi- 
tates something else and thereby brings rational order into 
nature. Causation, as a system of physical forces in material 
objects, must be recognized. But, if physical objects are 
just collections of sensations, how can one thing be said to 
cause or necessitate something else, and what becomes of the 
uniformity of nature 3 
Show me, he chal- 
lenges, one case of necessary causal connection between ma- 
terial things or  so-called events in physical nature. You will 
and can never find any such instance. T h e  best you can do 
is to point to certain events which, so far  as we know, have 
always occurred in conjunction. But this is no proof that 
they will continue to  be thus correlated, or, in short, that  the 
relation between them is one of necessary connection. W e  
have never perceived any such relation in the physical world, 
such that natural uniformities must be traced to supernatural 
agencies. This  fact of the absence of strictly causal rela- 
tions between things recommends itself to us when we an- 
alyse, as we have done, the nature of material things. They 
reveal themselves to  us, according to Berkeley, as wholly 
passive or  inert complexes of sensations or  percepts. W e  
Berkeley is ready with an answer. 
96 Public Lectures 
never sense one sensation or group of such as acting upon 
another.’ N o t  one of them is really causally operative, 
“making” others by its own agency. If Berkeley lived in our 
day, he might cite moving pictures as evidence of this thesis. 
It appears, on the screen, that certain things are acting upon 
others to  make them behave as they do, but we know per- 
fectly well that between one colored figure on the screen and 
another there is no real causal relation. So in ordinary per- 
ception of material things. These are made up of sensations, 
visual and non-visual, none of which really causes another. 
T h e  whole panorama of physical nature is just a tissue of 
e fec ts ,  in themselves totally incapable of activity. 
I t  is interesting to  think that the upshot of this view is 
in accord with the findings of quantum theory in recent 
physics, which asserts that between events in nature there 
is no real interaction, no strict or dynamic causation, but 
only correlations or coexistences, on the basis of which cer- 
tain general averages are statistically obtained to serve as 
the “causal laws” of nature. Berkeley would have been 
delighted to  learn that physicists, by their own machinations, 
had chanced across such a view of physical causation, with 
the category of physical force ruled out. This positivistic 
tendency in present-day science is what Russell had in mind 
when he said that modern physics is becoming less “muscu- 
lar” and more “visual”. Physical force is something the 
mind is tempted to  read into material things, on the analogy 
of its own volitional experience of energy. But the cautious 
scientist, according to  Russell and Berkeley, will content 
himself with mere correlations as laws of nature. Physics 
can get along without the concept of physical agency. 
Now Berkeley has called nature a system of effects, and 
effects imply causes. Though there are no active causes ilz 
De Motu,  Works, Vol. I, pp. 501-504, et pasrim. 
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physical nature, there are, he argues, active causes of physi- 
cal nature. Genuine causal relations exist, not between 
material thing and material thing, but between mind and 
material thing. But obviously our minds have not willed o r  
caused the existence of such things as a perceived river or  
mountain, though they may be responsible for a purely 
imagined one. Wha t  mind, then, is responsible for  the per- 
ceived world called physical nature ? 
As we noticed before, Berkeley subscribes to  the general 
belief in something behind sensory appearances, something 
other than our own minds, though he denies that it is matter. 
Behind or  beyond the webs of cosmic appearances which con- 
stitute physical nature is not matter, but Spirit o r  Mind, and 
it is God’s infinite mind. A t  last, we come to something 
genuinely capable of causal action on a grand scale. Of 
mind’s capacity to act, we have immediate evidence in the 
case of our own minds. W e  are capable of willing, thinking, 
imagining, which activities produce the common effects we 
are all acquainted with. Mind can do, it can create. Just 
as, by our own volition, we can create images or a whole 
imaginary world, so God, by exerting his will directly upon 
us or  causally affecting us by his divine activity creates the 
sensations in us which we call the physical world. This is 
the world we become aware of in sense-perception, and the 
reason for the prevailing belief in its permanence and public 
status is now clear. W e  ourselves are not the cause of physi- 
cal nature. God causes it in our minds-in the previously 
defined sense of “in”-by operating upon us from without, 
in the non-spatial sense of “without”. T h e  uniformity of 
nature is simply the result of God’s resolution or  inclination 
to persist in certain general kinds of activity, affecting his 
creatures-us finite minds-by the same “powers” in his in- 
finite mind, and thus establishing a unified society and a basis 
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for communication.’ F o r  example, if  two of us should plan 
to meet a week hence a t  this hour, the eventual agreement 
between the two time series in the two minds involved would 
be due not to a single time-system common to both, but to 
God’s having resolved to affect these minds with similar se- 
quences of sensations of light and dark (day and night). 
And so there is cosmos instead of chaos, despite the fact that 
there is no single physical world which includes us all. Wha t  
includes us all, in the peculiarly mental sense of inclusion, is 
the spirit of God, not inanimate nature. 
According to  Berkeley, you have less reason to doubt the 
existence of God than the existence of other finite spirits 
such as yourselves. This part of his argument is perhaps the 
most original, and sheds considerable light on his natural 
philosophy. If my presentation of it fails to win your sym- 
pathy, you may be sure that it is not Berkeley’s fault. Berke- 
ley said he wrote books not to force men to his conclusions 
but rather t o  make them think. T h e  purpose of this lec- 
ture is to induce you to  read Berkeley’s works. You will 
find there, in Alciphron, a theory of divine visual language 
which will incline you to  dwell with it in thought, with no 
sense of time wasted. I shall, in conclusion, commend this 
theory to your judgment. 
W h a t  evidence have I of your existence not as a material 
thing but as a spirit or mind? T h e  fact that I see what I 
call your face and apparently the light of speculation in 
your eyes does not demonstrate your existence as a spirit, 
but only as a material thing. I would experience a skillfully 
constructed robot in exactly the same manner. But if I do  
not take you to be a robot, it is because you address me in 
conventional symbols. You speak to me in words whose 
l Whether one finite mind directly acts upon another is an open question 
for readers of Berkeley. See G. Dawes Hicks: Berkeley, p. 148. 
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meaning experience has taught me. You are capable of 
using a language significant by convention, to express your 
intentions and to  otherwise inform me. T h a t  is why I be- 
lieve that accompanying the complex of qualities I take to 
be your body is a mind and that this mind is essentially you. 
Now notice the main characteristics of the language by 
means of which mind communicates with mind. In the first 
place, words rarely mean things by being similar to them. 
T h e  written or spoken word “man”, for  example, is not like 
men o r  human nature. Similarity of sign and thing signified 
plays little or no part  in linguistic symbolism. Secondly, 
there is no necessary connection between sign and thing sig- 
nified. There is nothing in nature which logically or  physi- 
cally requires the visible or audible mark “man” to be 
conjoined with what it means. In  the third place, language 
is a convention which minds institute by fiat of will. And 
fourthly, it must be learned. When you hear or  see a Greek 
word for  the first time, you do not know what it means. 
You must, by experience, learn the meanings of the words in 
any language. 
If you will grant that  anything which has these four 
characteristics is a language, Berkeley can prove that the 
whole of visible nature is a language, and the language of a 
powerful benevolent spirit which you should be willing to 
call God. I think we need take only one example to drive 
Berkeley’s argument home. 
When, as infants, we first saw a wavering yellow patch of 
color, we did not know what this color-sensation was or 
meant. So we put forth our hands to get a tactual sensation. 
T h e  result was painful. W e  were badly burned. Thus 
we learned the meaning of the color or  visual sensation, and 
came to  recognize the whole complex of sensations as flame 
or  fire. Later,  the association in our minds of the color- 
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sensation with certain other sensations became so habitual 
that we said we could “see” the fire, though, in literal truth, 
we were visually aware only of a patch of color. W e  had so 
perfectly mastered the meaning of the visual sign that we 
began to  confuse it with its various meanings, as we look 
straight through words to  their meanings when we master 
some language. Furthermore, those visual sensations so 
regularly meant or accompanied the other sensations that we 
were inveigled into the belief that there was a necessary con- 
nection between them. 
But let us stop to analyze the situation. Firstly, is there 
really a necessary connection between the yellowish patch of 
color and the sensation of being burned? I t  seems, rather, 
that we have simply closely associated the two ideas because 
they have so frequently occurred together. Analysis reveals 
that the occurrence of the one does not imply, by its very na- 
ture, the occurrence of the other. So one of the require- 
ments of a language is here fulfilled: there is no necessary 
connection between the color as sign and the temperature or  
tactual sensation as thing signified. Secondly, did we not 
have to learn, by experience or practice, the meaning of the 
objects of sight? W e  did, and this satisfies another require- 
ment of a language. Thirdly, is a visual sensation or color- 
patch similar to the non-visual sensations which it stands for ? 
Plainly, it is not, and so we have here a third characteristic 
of a language, namely, no similarity of the meaning-term 
to the thing meant. T h e  fourth characteristic, that language 
is a system of arbitrary’ symbols established by fiat of will, 
also belongs to sensed colors, or to  the immediate objects of 
vision. This may not seem so clear to  us, but it follows from 
what Berkeley claims to  have already proved. T h e  colors 
Notice that though a system of entities is “arbitrary”, it may neverthe- 
less be regulated and orderly. Thus is visible nature at once arbitrary and 
systematic, dependable. 
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which our sense-perceptions of a mountain reveal are obvi- 
ously not the result of our own volitional activity, nor of the 
will of any human spirit. Yet those color sensations must be 
the result of some volition or  mental operation, since it has 
been shown that matter cannot produce mental phenomena 
such as sensations. Therefore, there must be, as author of 
the whole visible world of colors, some great Personality 
beyond it which produces visual sensations in us by fiat of 
will. T h e  whole system of visible nature is, consequently, 
nothing but an arbitrary institution, a divine visual language, 
in terms of which God speaks to  us. And the physical sci- 
ences, inasmuch as they formulate and generalize the cor- 
relations between our sensations, are simply the grammar of 
God’s 1anguage.l Their function is to formulate its gram- 
matical rules which we call “laws of nature”, and thus make 
clear to us how the occurrence of certain things “means” the 
probable occurrence of certain other things. Even when the 
scientist peers through a microscope into what he calls a 
physical thing or  event, he is simply acquiring a deeper in- 
sight into God’s vocabulary by having new sensations. God 
then addresses him in novel terms whose meanings or  cor- 
relations he learns by experience. 
T h e  divine visual language signfies in two dimensions: in 
the physical and in the spiritual. In the physical dimension, 
the meaning of the language instructs us as to physical con- 
sequences. F o r  example, a red round visual sensation means 
that, if you will to proceed in a certain manner with refer- 
ence to it, you will get cool and sweet sensations as a conse- 
quence, the aggregate of which qualities is, by us, called an 
apple. Or,  a patch of yellow may mean that if you proceed 
thus and so, you will be burned. Thus God speaks in the 
physical dimension. But H i s  language betrays Hi s  inten- 
Works. Vol. I, p. 3 1 8 ;  Fraser’s note. 
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tions, besides merely indicating physical consequences, and 
this is its spiritual or  “affective”‘ significance. H e  who is 
concerned to tell you from your infancy that the result of cer- 
tain modes of behavior is pleasant or painful must be a lov- 
ing person or mind. And thus God tells us of Himself, that 
H e  is love, and so forth. 
Clearly then, if Berkeley’s theory of divine visual lan- 
guage is correct, we do have more evidence of God’s existence 
than of the existence of each other, since all visible nature 
bespeaks the presence of God, whereas we betray our pres- 
ence as spirits to each other only by comparatively few 
words. W e  read God’s language everywhere and whenever 
our eyes are open, but we read or hear one another’s lan- 
guage only during a small portion of conscious experience. 
And language alone demonstrates the existence of minds. 
T o  put a finishing touch to  Berkeley’s conception of na- 
ture, I shall say a word in answer to the question, how does 
the physical world look to God, according to this conception 
of i t ?  T h e  answer, though difficult because not quite clear 
on Berkeley’s own premises, is nevertheless important, since 
it requires us to  put our fingers on the central nerve of Berke- 
ley’s philosophy of nature. 
In one sense, God has no experience of a physical world. 
It does not exist for Him.* When God, as pure spirit o r  
volitional activity, operates as H e  pleases upon us, then 
sensations in the narrow limits of our minds arise, and the 
panorama of these constitutes physical nature. W e  experi- 
ence these sensations as a physical world, since, to us, they 
For the affective or “feeling” values of sense-data, see Hartshorne’s 
comments on Berkeley: Philosophy and Psychology o f  Sensation, pp. 91-94. 
F. D. Mabbot in “The Place of God in Berkeley’s Philosophy” (Jour. 
Philos.  Studies, 1931, p. 18 et seq.) conclusively shows that Berkeley simply 
could not have meant to say that physical nature is perceived and supported 
by God’s mind, as our finite minds perceive and support it. 
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are “objective” in the sense of not being the result of our 
own imagination. But nothing operates upon God, to give 
rise in Him to physical sensations. H e  is all-inclusive. Thus 
if God is aware a t  all of what we call the material world, 
H e  cannot experience it as material or objective, inde- 
pendent of His  will. Hence it would 
seem that if H e  is in any sense aware of our sensations- 
and Berkeley is not clear about this-they must appear to 
H i m  as objects of imagination appear to us. God could 
change the whole natural scene by a mere act of imagination 
even as we can create in imagination what we please; and if 
H e  does not actually do so, it is because H i s  divine nature 
is predisposed towards constancy. External to the realm of 
our imagination is the realm of sense-perception, the “real 
world” as we call it. But God knows the curb of no such 
external world. Everything is subjective to Him, in the 
sense of being the immediate product of H i s  divine mind.‘ 
Finally, Berkeley’s conception of nature lies completely 
before us-complete, if we do  not, as we shall not here, 
take into account Siris, a treatise he wrote in the evening 
of his life. T h e  picture of nature we have surveyed is well 
conceived, but in many respects it is perplexing. This con- 
ception of a material world without material substance, of 
a physical nature existing as sensations only in the realm of 
mind, attracts a swarm of questions which vex us. Such 
vexation, however, being intellectual, is thoroughly whole- 
some, and I shall leave you with questions swarming about 
you. T h e  exercise of clearing the air of intellectual flies de- 
velops the kind of muscles which may enable you to grasp 
H e  is its creator. 
* At the very beginning (Commoti  Place Book,  Works, Vol. I, p. 6 0 )  and 
at the very end (Sk is ,  Works, Vol. 111, p. 289) of his intellectual life, Berkeley 
wrote that in the last analysis, only persons exist. “All other things are not 
so much existences as manners of the existence of persons.” This is a deci- 
sion in favor of God’s point of view. 
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some new truth. And Berkeley, though convinced of the 
truth of his general theory of nature, wanted very much to 
make men think, whether or not they arrived a t  his conclu- 
sions. H e  succeeded so well in making men reflect for 
themselves that David Hume, born when Berkeley was 
twenty-six years old, developed, on a Berkeleyan basis, an 
argument which claimed to prove that, even as we have no 
knowledge of material substance, so are we ignorant of the 
existence of mind as spiritual substance. And both philoso- 
phy and science in our own day are reverberating with at- 
tempts either to refute o r  to prove Berkeley’s argument 
that mind cannot be assigned a place in physical nature since 
the place of nature is in mind. Englishman Locke, Irishman 
Berkeley, and Scotchman Hume constitute a philosophical 
triangle whose properties are as eternal as those of any 
triangle in geometry. 
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